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Sundt EditorialThe demise of aprotinin: Our share of the blame
Thoralf M. Sundt, MD
‘‘O
n November 5, 2007, after consultation with various health authorities
around the world, Bayer announced that it would temporarily suspend
worldwide marketing of Trasylol (aprotinin injection) until final
results from the BART [Blood Conservation using Antifibrinolytics: A Randomized
Trial in High-Risk Cardiac Surgery Patients] trial are compiled, received and evalu-
ated. Shipments of Trasylol from Bayer distribution centers were halted that day.’’1
Many received the news with a combination of frustration at the prospect of losing
access to a remarkably effective drug; others seemed quietly to celebrate that the com-
pany ‘‘finally got what it deserves,’’ a feeling generated by the high cost of the med-
ication and marketing tactics. Likely, to some degree, all of us felt a bit disturbed that
the government was reaching down into our practices and passing judgment on a drug
the risks and benefits of which we were surely in the best position to evaluate.
Shouldn’t we be able to sort this out on our own? How could the tables have turned
so quickly, and who is responsible for the demise of this agent? Is it the company’s
fault or the government’s fault, or do we share in the blame? How did we lose control
of this matter?
Aprotinin has been in clinical use for well over a decade, with an enormous liter-
ature behind it. Indeed, a PubMed search today (January 30, 2008) with ‘‘Aprotinin’’
yields 7028 references. But the drug has received particular attention in the last several
years after 2 large retrospective studies raised concerns about its safety, reporting an
increased risk of death among individuals receiving the medication.2,3 More concern-
ing, however, has been the preliminary analysis from the BART trial, a large, multi-
center, prospective, randomized clinical study being conducted under the auspices of
the Ottawa Health Institute at 25 Canadian medical centers. This study proposed to
test the hypothesis that aprotinin was superior to 2 other antifibrinolytic agents, tra-
nexamic acid and aminocaproic acid, in reducing the incidence of massive bleeding
with cardiac surgery.4 Although the results of the study have not yet been released,
the Data Safety Monitoring Board of the BART study informed the US Food and
Drug Administration in October 2007 that it had stopped enrolling patients in the
aprotinin treatment arm of the study because of ‘‘increased risk for death compared
to two other antifibrinolytic drugs used in the study.’’5 As a consequence, Bayer
Pharmaceutical Corporation suspended global marketing of the drug. Given the liti-
gious nature of our society, this likely represents the death knell for this medication.
A quick Internet search for the term ‘‘aprotinin’’ immediately brings up a number of
sponsored links for legal firms offering assistance to those who might have experi-
enced ‘‘Trasylol-related injury.’’
Aprotinin is certainly a remarkable drug. Its clinical efficacy in decreasing bleeding
after cardiopulmonary bypass surgery is immediately apparent to anyone who has
used it. As such, it speaks directly to the souls of cardiac surgeons and anesthesiolo-
gists who have spent countless hours in the operating room after a complex case trying
just to ‘‘stop the bleeding.’’ And yet concerns about the safety of the drug were raised
early on. Indeed, my own first presentation at a thoracic surgical meeting and first pub-
lication in the thoracic surgical literature concerned the risks of intravascular throm-
bosis and renal dysfunction with aprotinin.6 Our observations were not unique, nor
were our concerns.7,8 There quickly followed, however, a large number of subsequent
studies supporting the safety of the drug.9-11 Aprotinin was rapidly integrated into
practice; indeed, one of the most notable things about the drug is how quickly this in-
tegration occurred. Not only was it thought to be safe, but its virtues seemed quickly to
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stroke,13 and even cognitive dysfunction.14 There seemed
no downside at all to its use once the savings from reduced
blood transfusions were shown to counterbalance the cost
of the drug,15 but perhaps most notable was the remarkable
intensity of opinion held among discussants of the subject.
It was as if the drug has as powerful an effect on the individ-
ual administering the drug as the subject receiving the drug.
This is not a joking matter, however, because aprotinin is
an important drug despite its risks, and we are worse off
without it in our arsenal. Excessive bleeding continues to
be a source of significant morbidity and mortality among
high-risk individuals, and even those skeptics among us
with concerns about adverse side effects of the drug must
admit to using it on occasion. From a practical standpoint,
however, this is no longer an option for any of us. How could
this have happened? Could it have been our collective denial
of the risks and accordingly its promiscuous use in both low-
risk and high-risk patients that is at the root of its withdrawal
from the marketplace? How can we reconcile the differences
between the reported studies, and how can we understand our
own interpretations of the data? Well-performed studies
seemed to demonstrate aprotinin to be one of the few risk-
free interventions in cardiovascular surgery. Did we really
believe that a drug with such an impressive effect had no
downsides at all? Many of the findings now being presented
are not new. Risks of renal dysfunction and intravascular
clotting were identified more than a decade ago. Did the man-
ufacturer indeed withhold information from us and from the
US Food and Drug Administration (http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/09/30/health/30fda.html)? Did they fool us, or
did we fool ourselves?
Thomas Gilovich has addressed the question of cognitive
determinants of our beliefs in his book, How we know what
isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life.16
Gilovich addresses the characteristics of human perception
and misperception that influence our understanding of events
around us. Examining popular but mistaken assumptions, he
argues that our reasoning is so often faulty because of what
are at their roots self-serving beliefs: our use of incomplete,
ambiguous, or inconsistent data and a natural human ten-
dency to seek out ‘‘hypothesis-confirming evidence’’ and to
‘‘see what we expect to see.’’ Once we have formed a belief,
it is ‘‘human nature’’ to accept information consistent with
those beliefs at face value. Many of these concepts are fa-
miliar to us. What is perhaps less intuitive is the common
misconception that we simply overlook contradictory evi-
dence. But surely this was not the case with aprotinin given
the enormous literature on the subject. We examined the risks
seriously and scientifically, didn’t we?
The aprotinin storyline follows a familiar pattern. Literally
hundreds of analyses and clinical studies, mostly retrospec-
tive, have been performed on aprotinin. We have debated
the risks extensively and passionately. In fact, Gilovich16730 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery c Apmight argue that this is exactly the point. In fact, he suggests
that we do not overlook contradictory evidence at all; rather,
we scrutinize it more critically than those data confirming our
opinions. This bias, if you will, derives from fundamental
cognitive function critical to our everyday life. We could
not possibly live productively if we critically examined
everything around us equally. It is only those matters that
seem ‘‘out of place’’ that draw our focused attention and
consideration.
Our ‘‘clinical experience’’ is profoundly affected by these
basic cognitive characteristics. We remember the remarkable
cases, especially those that went badly, and forget the ones
that go smoothly and uneventfully. We scrutinize those
events that seem to violate our beliefs in everyday practice,
as well as in the scientific literature. On the other hand, we
tend to recall events confirming our expectations with greater
clarity than those that are contradictory. An instance of
remarkable hemostasis in a patient known to be at high risk
for bleeding is recognized as a success for aprotinin. Postop-
erative renal dysfunction in the same patient, with a baseline
risk for such a complication, might be viewed as a nonevent:
just what is to be expected when one takes on ‘‘big cases.’’
Is there something sinister in our attention to confirmatory
evidence? No, it is merely a property of human psychology.
The important observation is that we must first be aware of
this tendency and then take extra efforts to guard against
being misled. Confirmatory evidence is easier to deal with
cognitively. This is particularly true if outcomes differ
according to hedonic (or emotional) consequences. Motiva-
tional determinants affect our cognition by subtly affecting
the evidence that we demand and the criticisms that we apply.
As for bleeding versus renal dysfunction, rationally we are
equally concerned with both types of morbidities. However,
we witness bleeding standing at the operating table or the pa-
tient’s bedside hour by hour, whereas renal failure frequently
evolves gradually and less dramatically. When we are sub-
consciously invested in the answer, it turns the question
from ‘‘Can I believe this?’’ to ‘‘Must I believe this?’’ The bur-
den of evidence shifts from ‘‘supportive’’ for confirmatory
evidence to ‘‘compelling’’ for contradictory evidence.
What is our safeguard against adherence to erroneous
beliefs? It is careful adherence to the scientific enterprise
itself that demands that outcomes be specified and specified
at the front end of any study. This is a critical strength of pro-
spectively randomized studies. Although it might be a source
of tremendous frustration to clinicians as they argue with stat-
isticians over the outcome of trials and apparent associations
that were not specified during that trial’s design, our adher-
ence to these principles of scientific investigation are critical
if we are to keep from fooling ourselves. Once those studies
have been performed, we must be cautious about the applica-
tion of the findings to broader clinical practice. Such an
approach might even have preserved the availability of an un-
questionably useful but potentially harmful drug.ril 2008
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